Abstract
Introduction
Non-interference is a property of a program which states that the program's publicly observable (i.e., low security) behavior is independent of its confidential (i.e., high security) inputs. Non-interference has applications in software security. We refer to the survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [11] for a general overview.
Motivated by earlier work by Roscoe [10] , Zdancewic and Myers proposed observational determinism [14] as a notion of non-interference for concurrent programs which roughly says that a program is secure if and only if its publicly observable behavior is independent of its confidential data and independent of process/thread scheduling. As such, unlike other notions of non-interference such as possibilistic security, observational determinism implies security regardless of the scheduler choice.
In the same paper, Zdancewic and Myers proposed a type system for enforcing observational determinism. However, their type system required the type checked program to be confluent in order to be verified secure. Confluence, even if relaxed to confluence up to observational parts of the program, can be a restrictive requirement. (Definitional observational determinism does not imply confluence.) This paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first type system that verifies observational determinism by itself for non-trivial concurrent programs. The type system integrates a flow-based security analysis with a fractional capabilitiesbased determinism checker in a novel way to allow programs to be non-deterministic in non-security-relevant por- tions of the program. In particular, our type system does not force confluence and can verify some non-confluent programs to be secure. In addition to added flexibility (e.g., being able to check determinism of concurrent reads), fractional capabilities enable efficient (polynomial time) type inference algorithm via linear programming.
Preliminaries
To concretize the presentation, we focus on the simple concurrent language shown in Figure 1 . We briefly describe the syntax. Meta variables x, x 1 , etc. range over (program) variables. Variables are immutable like in functional languages, whereas locations (i.e., first class reference cells) can be used for destructive updates. The construct ref x = e in s, creates a new location and initializes it to the result of evaluating e, and binds the location to the variable x. Note that the language allows locations to appear in the source syntax. This is needed so that low se-curity variables and high security variables in the classical information flow setting can be expressed as low security locations and high security locations. The language contains branches and loops. The construct spawn {s} creates a new thread to evaluate s. Threads may synchronize each other by sending signals over channels. Channels are dynamically created by chan x in s, which allocates a fresh channel, binds it to the variable x, and evaluates s. Signals are "asynchronous" in the sense that the sender does not need to wait for a receiver to send the signal. Finally, the language contains integer constants. Binary (deterministic) operations over integers (+, −, ×, ≤, etc.) are ranged over by the symbol op.
To describe non-interference, we consider programs with free locations, some of which are classified as high security locations or low security locations. The essence of information flow is to check if information contained in high security locations could leak to an attacker who can only observe the contents of low security locations. For instance, the program below leaks information in the high security location h to the low security location l .
l := 0; while ! h > 0 do ( l := ! l + 1; h := ! h − 1)
We define the semantics of the language by small-step reductions from states to states. A state is a triple (S, B, p) where S is a store mapping locations to values (v, see below), B is a mapping from channel constants (c) to a nonzero integer indicating the number of pending signals, and p is a program state defined as follows.
Here, the meta variable c ranges over channel constants. Expressions are extended to contain channel constants. A program state (p) is a parallel composition of (extended) statements.
We define the following general notations. Given a func-
Given strings u and v, we write u ∼ v if u and v are stutter equivalent. We write u ≺ v if there exists a substring w of v such that u ∼ w. Figure 2 shows the reduction rules. The evaluation contexts are defined as follows.
The reduction rules are mostly self-explanatory. The reduction rules use the evaluation rules for expressions of the form (S, e) ; v, also shown in Figure 2 the binary operator op. We let the sequential composition operator ; be associative with skip as an identity, that is,
The bottom three rules handle communication of signals over channels. A new channel is created with its number of pending signals set to 0. When a sender sends a signal over the channel, the number is incremented. The receiver blocks on a channel until there is a signal over the channel, and decrements the number by receiving the signal.
A trace, T , is a finite sequence of states. For i ≤ |T |, we write T (i) to denote the ith state of T . We write (S, B, p) ⇓ T if (S, B, p) = T (1) and T (i) → T (i + 1) for 1 ≤ i < |T |. We write s ⇓ T if (S, ∅, s) ⇓ T for some S such that dom(S) is the set of free locations in s and ran(S) ⊆ Z (for simplicity, we assume that the initial store only contains integers). For a set of locations K ⊆ dom(S), we write (S, B, p)| K for S| K . We extend the same notation to traces, that is, T | K is a sequence of stores restricted to K such that the ith element is T (i)| K .
We define observational determinism following [14, 6] 1 . Informally, s is observationally deterministic if its trace restricted to the updates to the low security locations is independent of thread scheduling and the initial contents of the high security locations. 
Observational determinism is a quite strong notion of security. For instance, observational determinism implies deterministic updates to the low security locations (because t|H = t|H for any state t). Therefore, for example, the following program is not observationally deterministic w.r.t. ({ l }, ∅). (There are no high security locations.)
For motivation behind the definition of observational determinism, we refer to the paper by Zdancewic and Myers [14] (or the paper by Huisman et al. [6] ) which contains excellent examples illustrating why a more relaxed notion of security may be problematic.
The Type System
We present a type system that guarantees that a typable program is observationally deterministic. We informally describe the basic idea. In short, the type system combines a flow-based analysis for non-interference [14] with a fractional capability-based determinism checker for concurrent programs [2, 13] . Intuitively, the type system applies a security flow analysis to check that there is no flow (including implicit flow from branches and loops) from high security level to low security level, and also infers the program parts that must be at low security level and therefore need to be deterministic. Then, the type system applies a fractional capability analysis to verify that those parts are indeed deterministic. Only checking determinism for parts of the program allows the type system to accept programs that are not totally deterministic (see Section 3.1 and 4 for some examples.)
The following example illustrates the basic idea.
Note that the program is not observationally deterministic w.r.t. ({ l }, ∅) because depending on the thread scheduling, l is either assigned 0 or 1. To detect this, the type system first infers that, for l to be at low security level, the branch condition !x must be at low security level and thus needs to be deterministic. Then, the type system tries to find a fractional capability assignment that would prove the determinism of !x, and fails to do so (because it is non-deterministic), and the program is rejected as possibly not observationally deterministic.
We now formally describe the type system. The types are defined as follows.
Each type is qualified by a security level: h or l. Intuitively, values of the type qualified by h may depend on high security information or thread scheduling, whereas those qualified by l are guaranteed to be independent of them. Security levels form the usual two point lattice such that l h and h l. The least upper bound of q 1 and q 2 is written q 1 q 2 .
The accessor function qual and ty are defined as follows.
qual(int
Security levels induce the subtyping relation
The type system represents locations statically as abstract locations, ranged over by meta variables κ, κ 1 , etc. Each abstract location denotes a set of (concrete) locations so that a location of the type ref (κ, τ ) q is in the set represented by κ. Similarly, channels are represented by as abstract channels, ranged over by γ, γ 1 , etc., each denoting a set of (concrete) channels. Meta variables ρ, ρ 1 , etc. range over abstract resources, used to refer to both abstract locations and abstract channels. Meta variables Ψ, Ψ 1 , etc. range over capability mappings, which are functions from abstract resources to non-negative rational numbers [0, ∞).
There are two reasons for using abstract resources. One is to allow aliasing of resources, because both locations and channels are first class objects and so the static system cannot track their identity precisely. The second reason is to group all low security locations in the same abstract location. The type system ensures that accesses to l-level locations (i.e., locations with the type of the form ref(κ, τ ) q such that qual(τ ) = l) happen observationally deterministically at the granularity of abstract resources. Therefore, if multiple l-level locations are grouped in the same abstract location, then access to all those locations as a whole happen observationally deterministically.
Recall capability mapping (Ψ, Ψ 1 , etc.) is a function from abstract resources to non-negative rational numbers [0, ∞). A capability mapping denotes access capabilities to abstract resources. Each thread holds some amount of capabilities, representing the access capabilities of the thread.
Only the threads holding the capability Ψ such that Ψ(κ) ≥ 1 are allowed to write to an l-level abstract location κ, whereas only the threads holding the capability Ψ such that Ψ(κ) > 0 are allowed to read low security values. (Therefore, the write capability implies the read capability.) The type system ensures that the total amount of capabilities summed across all live threads is at most 1 for any abstraction location. This guarantees that there are no other threads that can access an l-level location when some thread is writing to the location, guaranteeing deterministic low-security accesses to the location.
For example, this scheme soundly rejects the following program where l is a low security location. To see this, note that in order to type check both writes to l , both threads must be given the capability 1 to access the abstract location representing l , but this violates the "at most 1" criteria.
Only demanding non-negative rationals for reads allow parallel deterministic reads. For instance, the following program, where l is a low security location, can be type checked by giving both the spawned and the spawner threads a fractional amount (e.g., 0.5) of the capability to access x.
The type system allows capability passing between threads so that multiple threads may access the same l-level location. Capabilities can be passed when threads synchronize over a channel. For instance, to type check the following program (where l is a low security location), we pass the capability to access l initially held by the spawned thread (i.e., the one that does l := 0) to the spawner thread (i.e., the one that does l := 1) when sending a signal over the channel c. chan c in spawn { l := 0; send c}; wait c; l := 1
To statically reason about capability passing, a channel type contains a capability mapping indicating the amount of capabilities passed from the sender to the receiver when communicating over the channel. That is, a channel of the type type chan(γ, Ψ) q can be used to pass Ψ amount of capabilities from the sender to the receiver.
It is necessary to check that capability passing happens observationally deterministically to disallow cases such as the one below where l is a low security location.
chan c in spawn {wait c; l := 0}; spawn {wait c; l := 1}; send c
To this end, the type system only allows the threads holding the capability Ψ such that Ψ(γ) ≥ 1 to receive capabilities from channels in γ. As with abstract locations, the type system ensures that the total amount of capabilities summed across all live threads is at most 1 for an abstract channel. Therefore, at any point in time, there is at most one thread that can receive capabilities from the channel. As with locations, capabilities to access channels can also be passed, allowing multiple threads to use the same channel to pass capabilities. We define arithmetic operations over capabilities. The addition and subtraction of capability mappings are defined point-wise as
For convenience, we let 0 denote a constant capability mapping that maps all abstract resources to 0, that is, 0 = λρ.0. Therefore, for example, 0 [ρ → 1] is a capability mapping that maps ρ to 1 and ρ to 0 for all ρ = ρ. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the type checking rules. The judgement for expressions is of the form Γ, Ψ e : τ where Γ is a type environment mapping variables and locations to their types, Ψ is the pre-capability before the evaluation of e (and after, because expressions do not change thread's capabilities), and τ is the type of e. The judgement for statements is of the form Γ, Ψ 1 , q s : Ψ 2 where the context security level q is used to capture implicit flow induced by branches, Ψ 1 is the pre-capability of s, and the postcapability Ψ 2 is the capability after the evaluation of s.
We briefly discuss each rule. VAR, INT, LOC, OP, SEQ, and SKIP are self-explanatory. IF and WHILE increase the security level inside the branch/loop bodies by Figure 3 . The type checking rules for expressions. the security level of the branch/loop condition to account for the implicit information flow. Note that these rules make sure that capabilities are "conserved" through the sequential flow of computation, that is, the post-capability may not exceed their pre-capability. At SPAWN, the parent thread gives a part of its capability (Ψ 1 ) to the newly created thread, and so Ψ − Ψ 1 amount of capability is left for the continuation of the parent thread.
REF, READ
, and WRITE type location accesses. REF is self-explanatory. At WRITE, the hypothesis1 qual(τ ) ensures that the context security level (i.e., q) is below that of the location (i.e., qual(τ )). This is needed to disallow implicit information flow such as
where h is a high security location and l is a low security location. Also, the security level of the reference (i.e., q 1 ) must be below qual(τ ). This is needed because locations are first class, and disallows programs like the one below.
where h is a high security location and l1 , l2 are low security locations. As remarked before, the hypothesis qual(τ ) = ⇒ Ψ(κ) ≥ 1 asserts that to write to a low security location, the thread must own the full (i.e., 1) capability to access it. Note that WRITE allows writing a low security level value to an h-level location. In such a case, no capability constraints are imposed.
As remarked before READ's hypothesis qual(τ ) = l ⇒ Ψ(κ) > 0 ensures that only a thread holding a non-zero capability may read a low security value from the location. Also, READ ensures q 1 qual(τ ). As in WRITE, this is needed because locations are first class and disallows pro- grams like the one below.
where h is a high security location and l is a low security locations. ( a , b are some arbitrary locations.) Note that READ allows reading a high security value from an llevel location. In such a case, no capability constraints are imposed. NEWC, SEND, and RECV handle signals. NEWC checks channel allocation, and is self-explanatory. Note that the post-capabilities in SEND and RECV reflect the capability passing remarked earlier, that is, the capability Ψ 1 is passed from the sender to the receiver.
At RECV, the hypothesis 0 < Ψ 1 ⇒ Ψ(γ) ≥ 1 ensures that if the passed capability is non-zero, then the thread must have the full capability to access the channel. As remarked before, this is needed to ensure that the capability passing happens deterministically. SEND and RECV require the context security level and the security level of the channel to be at l. This disallows cases such as the one below where h is a high security location and l is a low security location.
Note that this program would type check if the hypothesis were missing because it would allow sending the capability to access l via both the channel c and d. The type system remains sound if the rule is relaxed so that the security levels need to be l only if the passed capability is non-zero, as shown in Figure 5 . Unfortunately, these rules induce cyclic dependencies between capability constraints and security level constraints, and make type inference somewhat more complex. We now state the soundness of the type system. 
The condition (1) follows from the fact that initial stores map locations to integers. The condition (2) ensures that high security locations have high security level. The condition (3) ensures that low security locations share the same abstract location, and have low security level. The condition (4) ensures that s can be typed with a pre-capability of at most 1 for any abstract resource.
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness) If (s, L, H) then s is observationally deterministic w.r.t. (L, H).
The proof of the theorem appears in Appendix B.
Example
Consider the following program. Note that the contents of a at the end of the program is non-deterministic as it depends on the thread scheduling, and the content of b at the end of the program depends on the value of the high security location.
The type system can type check this program. The key is to give the channel c the type of the form
q where c is given the type of the form
This allows passing of the (full) capability to access c to the spawned thread after the write to c by the spawner thread, and back to the spawner thread after the spawned thread is done with its write to c . Thus, ! c at the last line can be given a low security type, and the program type checks.
Confluence and Observational Determinism
Note that the example above is not confluent as updates to a cannot be "undone", though the low security part of the store (i.e., l ) is confluent. However, in general, observational determinism does not imply confluence even restricted to the low security locations. We show that our type system can actually check some of such "observationally non-confluent" programs to be observationally deterministic.
Let t 1 → * t 2 be 0 or more reduction steps from t 1 to t 2 . Formally, a state t is said to be confluent if t → * t 1 and t → * t 2 imply that there exist states t 1 , t 2 such that t 1 → * t 1 and t 1 → * t 2 and t 1 ≡ t 2 where ≡ is some suitable equivalence relation. A program s is confluent if for all S such that dom(S) is the set of free locations in s, (S, ∅, s) is confluent. A reasonable choice for ≡ may be equality up to renaming of variables/locations/channels and process reordering. A more relaxed notion can be obtained by only requiring such a relation on the stores, or some portion of the stores.
Consider the simple producer-consumer program shown in Figure 6 . The program spawns four threads, the first thread is the producer thread that writes 0, 1, . . . , 9 to x. The second thread is the consumer thread that reads from x. Via channels c 1 and c 2 , the second thread (the consumer) synchronizes with the first thread (the producer) to read (some prefix of ) 0, 1, . . . 9. The consumer thread also waits on signals sent via d, which are sent by the third thread. Finally, the fourth thread also receives signals via d.
The program is observationally deterministic w.r.t. ({ l }, ∅). Note that because there are no high security locations, the only source of information leak is through non-determinism due to the thread scheduling. The program is observationally deterministic because the updates to l is some prefix of 0, 1, . . . , 9 regardless of the thread scheduling. Our type system is able to type check this program by assigning the location l the type ref(κ, int) l , channels c 1 , c 2 the type chan(γ, 0 [κ → 1]) l for some γ, and channel d the type chan(γ , 0 ) q for some q, γ . This program is not confluent even restricted to the low security location l . To see this, consider a series of reductions in which the loop in the fourth thread waits on d until after the consumer thread writes to l ten times. In this series, the updates to l are exactly 0, 1, . . . , 9. Now, consider another series of execution where the fourth thread receives a signal from d at least once before the consumer thread writes to l ten times. Then, the sequence of updates to l is some strict prefix of 0, 1, . . . , 9. It is impossible for the two series to reduce to states that have the same value for l , in particular, the latter series cannot reach the 10th update.
In general, even when restricted to differences in low security locations, it would be difficult to guarantee confluence because it would mean that any potential operation preceding an update to a low security location must be deterministically blocking or non-blocking. In particular, this implies that termination/non-termination of the preceding loops must be deterministic.
Type Inference
We give a polynomial time type inference algorithm (more precisely, a typability algorithm). That is, given (s, L, H), the algorithm decides whether (s, L, H). We informally describe the algorithm. The algorithm is separated in three phases. The first phase is a security flow analysis phase that decorates the derivation tree with security levels. We make the first phase find the greatest security level assignments (i.e., preferring h over l wherever possible). If no solution can be found in this phase (e.g., trying to find q such that h q and q l), the algorithm rejects the program as untypable. The first phase ignores capability constraints. The second phase finds capability assignments for channels, which involves resolving the constraints 0 < Ψ 1 ⇒ Ψ(γ) ≥ 1 from RECV, i.e., determines when Ψ 2 (γ) < 1 so that it must be the case that Ψ = 0 . Finally, the third phase uses the information obtained from the first two phases to find capability assignments for locations. The third phase uses the inferred security levels to determine which Ψ(ρ) > 0 and Ψ(ρ) ≥ 1 constraints to discharge (i.e., the hypothesis qual(τ ) = l ⇒ . . . at WRITE and READ). The second and the third phase finds the capability assignments by reducing the capability constraint Figure 7 . Representative type inference rules.
satisfaction problem to linear programming instances.
Phase 1
The first phase is mostly a standard unification-based type inference, generating security level constraints and capability constraints on the side. Figure 7 shows a few representative constraint generation rules (corresponding to the type rules VAR, INT, LOC, OP, READ, REF, and RECV). Here, r's are security level variables, ϕ's are capability mapping variables, α's are type variables (actually, types with the outer-most security level stripped), 's are abstract location variables, and ζ's are abstract channel variables. Each rule is a straightforward syntax-directed constraint generation rule for a rule from Figure 3 and Figure 4 .
The judgement for expressions, Δ, ϕ e : α r ; C, is read "given environment Δ, e is inferred to have the type α r and the pre-capability ϕ, with the set of constraints C." The judgement for statements is of the form Δ, ϕ 1 , r s : ϕ 2 ; C, and is read "under given environment Δ, s is inferred to have the pre-capability ϕ 1 , the post-capability ϕ 2 , and the context security level r, with the set of constraints C." For simplicity, we assume that let-bound variables are distinct. We initialize Δ to map each variable and location to a fresh type variable qualified by a fresh security level variable (i.e., α r 's where each α and r are distinct). Then, we visit each expression in a bottom up manner to build the set of constraints, applying a syntax-directed constraint generation rule at each AST node.
Analyzing a program s, we get Δ, ϕ s , r s : ϕ s ; C. We use the generated constraints C and the pre-capability of the whole program, ϕ s , in the rest of the algorithm.
We add to C the following constraints to enforce the conditions (1), (2) , and (3) from Definition 3.1.
• For each free in the program s, the constraint
where , r 1 , r 2 are fresh.
• For each ∈ H, the constraint
where , r are fresh.
• Let be a fresh abstract location variable, then, for each ∈ L, the constraint
The resulting set of constraints contains six kinds of constraints: (e) Channel access constraints:
where
Note that an equality constraint o 1 = o 2 can be expressed by the constraints o 1 o 2 and o 2 o 1 , and an equality constraint φ 1 = φ 2 can be expressed by the constraints φ 1 ≥ φ 2 and φ 2 ≥ φ 1 .
The first phase deals with the constraint kinds (a), (b), and (c), and leaves the rest for the other two phases. Constraints of the kind (a) can be solved by the standard unification algorithm, which may generate more constraints of the kinds (b) and (c) (as types may contain security levels and capability mappings). Constraints of the kind (b) can also be resolved by the standard unification algorithm. The unification may fail to find a solution to the constraints of the kind (a), e.g., if the program uses an integer constant as a channel. If so, the algorithm rejects the program as untypable at this point.
After processing all constraints of the kind (a) and (b), the algorithm tries to find the greatest solution for the constraints of the kind (c). By greatest, we mean the solution that assigns h to the largest set of security level variables. The reason for wanting the greatest solution is to prevent discharging local access constraints (f) as much as possible to reduce capability constraints solved in the third phase. The greatest solution can be obtained by repeatedly selecting a constraint r l from the constraint set, and substituting l for r until there are no more constraints of that kind. The constraints are unsatisfiable if h l appears in the constraints as a result, in which case, the program is rejected as untypable. Otherwise, all unassigned security level variables are set to h, and phase 1 returns the resulting constraint set C with all the security level variables, type variables, and abstract location/channel variables substituted by their computed assignments.
Phase 2
The second phase takes care of the channel access constraints, i.e., the constraints of the kind (e) and (d) (constraints (d) are also used in phase 3). We informally describe the process. Note that each channel access constraint, that is, 0 < ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 (ζ) ≥ 1, can be restated as ϕ 2 (ζ) < 1 ⇒ 0 ≥ ϕ 1 . For each ζ (that is, its equivalence class obtained by the unification in phase 1), we look for a capabilities assignment that minimizes discharging of the right hand side of ϕ 2 (ζ) < 1 ⇒ 0 ≥ ϕ 1 . Note that the constraint resolution in phase 1 guarantees that if ϕ 2 (ζ) < 1 ⇒ 0 ≥ ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 (ζ) < 1 ⇒ 0 ≥ ϕ 1 are in C, then ϕ 1 = ϕ 1 (more precisely, it is implied by the channel inequality constraints of the kind (d)) because ϕ 1 , ϕ 1 are both denote the capabilities passed when communicating over a channel in ζ. Thus, it suffices to add a single constraint 0 ≥ ϕ 1 to discharge all constraints for ζ if their left hand sides (in the original form) are found to be unsatisfiable.
We now describe the process more formally. For each ζ, let CC(ζ) be the right hand side of set of all channel access constraints for ζ, and cz(ζ) is negation of one of the left hand sides. More precisely, CC(ζ) and cz(ζ) are defined as follows.
The algorithm picks some ζ, and tries to satisfy CC(ζ) along with the capability inequality constraints by assuming that ϕ 2 (ζ ) ≥ 1 for all channel constraints ϕ 2 (ζ ) < 1 ⇒ 0 ≥ ϕ 1 such that ζ = ζ. If satisfiable, the algorithm repeats, picking another abstract channel variable. If unsatisfied, we add cz(ζ) to the set of constraints that need to be satisfied, and repeats the process by picking another channel access constraint. Figure 8 shows the pseudo-code implementing phase 2. The algorithm takes the set of constraints C computed by phase 1 as the input. The algorithm instantiates each capability variable as a fresh linear programming variable so that the procedure LPSat checks whether the given set of rational linear inequality constraints is satisfiable. Such a procedure can be implemented by well-known linear programming algorithms such as the simplex algorithm and interior points methods. Recall that ϕ e is the pre-capability of the whole program. The constraint 1 ≥ ϕ e enforces the condition (3) from Definition 3.1. The constraints NonNeg enforces the non-negativity of capabilities. The algorithm returns ZC which contains the capability variables that must be set to 0 .
Phase 3
The third phase completes the type inference by taking care of the location access constraints (i.e., the constraints of the kind (f)). Like phase 2, we use linear programming to find satisfying assignments for the location access capabilities. For each , let LC( ) be the set of constraints consisting of the right hand sides of the discharged location access constraints for . More precisely, LC( ) can be defined as follows.
where C is the constraints computed by phase 1. Note that phase 1 has computed assignments for all the security level variables and so we know which location access constraints to discharge at this point. As in phase 2, let
NonNeg := {ϕ ≥ 0 | ϕ appears in C} CI = Capability inequality constraints in C Then, we check whether LPSat (LC( ) ∪ NonNeg ∪ ZC ∪ CI ∪ {1 ≥ ϕ e }) where ZC was computed by phase 2. If the constraints are satisfiable for all , then the program is found to be typable. Otherwise, the program is rejected as untypable.
Handling Strict Inequalities Note that the constraint ϕ > 0 is strict, which is often not (directly) supported by linear programming algorithms. To this end, we add a fresh linear programming variable and replace each ϕ > 0 with ϕ ≥ , and set the objective function to be . We ask the linear programming algorithm to find a solution that maximizes . If the solver returns a solution such that > 0, then we have found a satisfying assignment. Otherwise, the constraint set is rejected as unsatisfiable.
Computational Complexity
We discuss the computational complexity of the type inference algorithm. The size of linear programming instances solved in phase 2 and phase 3 is linear in the size of the capability constraints generated by phase 1. The number of linear programming instances solved in phase 2 is equal to the number of distinct equivalence classes ζ from phase 1, and similarly, the number of linear programming instances solved in phase 3 is at equal to the number of distinct equivalence classes from phase 1. The linear programming instances from phase 1 and phase 2 can be solved in polynomial time by linear programming algorithms such as interior points methods. Hence, both phase 1 and phase 2 can be solved in time polynomial in the size of the constraints generated by phase 1.
Finally, phase 1 can resolve the type and security levels constraints in time polynomial in the size of the program, and therefore, the size of the constraints passed to phase 2 and 3 is at most polynomial in the size of the program. Hence, the total running time is polynomial in the size of the program.
Related Work
Most type systems (e.g., [5, 9, 7] ) for non-interference in concurrent programs are designed to check a security notion weaker than or incomparable to observational determinism, such as possibilistic security. As such, they are unsuitable for enforcing observational determinism.
Zdancewic and Myers [14] propose to verify observational determinism by applying security flow analysis and determinism checking (in fact, confluence) separately. In contrast, our type system utilizes information obtained from the security flow analysis to check determinism only for the parts of the program that are inferred to require determinism. Among other things, this scheme allows the type system to verify some non-confluent observationallydeterministic programs.
Huisman et al. [6] propose to check observational determinism via self composition [4, 1] . Because they use a different definition of observational determinism (see Appendix A), their self composition does not reduce to a safety problem. It is easy to reduce observational determinism defined in this paper to a safety problem via self composition. Combining security type systems with self composition has been investigated for sequential programs [12, 8] . We leave for future work to investigate if they can be combined for checking observational determinism.
The use of fractional capabilities for checking determinism is inspired by Terauchi and Aiken's type system for checking determinism of concurrent programs [13] , which was in turn inspired by static capability systems for reasoning about program resources [2, 3] . However, their type system enforces confluence and demands determinism over the entire program, whereas the type system in this paper only checks determinism for some parts of the program.
Conclusions
We have presented a type system for verifying observational determinism. The type system enforces observational determinism by itself, and does not require the type checked program to be confluent. The type system combines a flow-based analysis for non-interference with a fractional capability-based determinism checker so that only the parts that are inferred to be relevant for security are checked for determinism. We have also presented a polynomial time type inference algorithm that utilizes linear programming. traces. For a state t, we write t ⇓ ∞ U where U is a infinite sequence of states such that either U (1) = t and U (i) → U (i + 1) for all i ≥ 1, or there exists n ≥ 1 where U (1) = t, U (i) → U (i + 1) for all 1 ≤ i < n, there exists no state t such that U (n) → t , and U (i) = U (i + 1) for all i ≥ n. We write s ⇓ ∞ U if (S, ∅, s) ⇓ ∞ U where dom(S) is the set of free locations in e. We extend restriction operation (| K ) and stutter equivalence (∼) to infinite strings in a straightforward way. Then, their definition of observational determinism can be stated as follows. 
Definition
There are two issues with this definition. One is that it still allows information leak as seen in the program below.
if ! h then l1 := 1; l2 := 1 else l2 := 1; l1 := 1
Here, h is a high security location and l1 , l2 are low security locations. The program is observationally deterministic according to their definition (and not according to ours). But, the attacker can learn information about the content of h by observing if l1 is updated before l2 .
The second issue is that checking observational determinism according to their definition requires the static analysis to be able to answer a liveness 2 question of the form "eventually, the traces agree on each other, forever." For this reason, the self composition reduction in their paper [6] is not a safety problem. It also seems difficult to enforce such a requirement via type-based methods without being overly conservative.
B Proof of Soundness
We give a rough outline of the proof. The idea is to define an instrumented semantics that records updates to the low security locations. Then, confluence with this semantics implies determinism restricted to updates to the low security locations. Unfortunately, our type system does not guarantee confluence, and we also have to take in account of high security locations. To this end, we define an erasure operation that erases all portions of the program that are typable in a high security program context or has a high security level type. In addition to recording updates for each abstract location, we let the reduction rules for erased states ignore updates to h-level locations and the number of pending signals for non-capability passing channels. It is shown that the erased semantics is confluent, and simulates the low security updates of the original. Then, observational determinism follows from these facts.
The individual techniques used in the proof are not new. Erasure technique is often used to prove correctness of non-interference type systems (e.g., [7] ), and fractional capabilities-based confluence argument is from [13] . Therefore, we only detail the part of the proof that shows how the existing techniques are integrated.
First, we define the notion of a well-typed state. We extend the type rule to type run-time states by extending Γ to map constant channels to types and introducing the following rule.
Γ, Ψ c : Γ(c)
Recall that a program state p is a parallel composition of finitely many threads, that is, it is of the form s 1 ||s 2 || . . . ||s n .
Definition B.1 (Well-typed State) Suppose
In (5), a × Ψ = λρ.a × Ψ(ρ).
Lemma B.2 Initial states of a well-typed program are welltyped.

B.1 Marking
To prepare the source program for erasure, we define a marking of the program which marks program parts to be erased. Given a typable program , we mark each statement with its context security level and each expression with the security level of its type. We write mark(s) to denote the mark of s and mark(e) to denote the mark of e. That is, if Γ, Ψ e : τ is a subderivation for the program, then mark(e) = qual(τ ), and if Γ, Ψ 1 , q s : Ψ 2 is a subderivation of the type derivation for the program, then mark(s) = q. Note that the type rules guarantee that if a subexpression is marked h, then the expression is marked h, and if a statement is marked h, then its substatements are marked h.
To preserve marks across reductions, we introduce the following derived type rule.
Above, we let mark(s) = h. Note that adding the rule does not change the power of the type system as the rule can be derived as a lemma. With the additional rule, the following holds. Proof: By case analysis on the reduction kind. The derived rule is used to prove the cases for if and while. 2 Justified by the above lemma, in the remainder of the proof, we usually carry typing along the reductions, e.g.,
Lemma B.3 (Preservation)
, and assume that the statements are marked according to the typing.
B.2 Erasure
We extend values for erasure states with a special value such that v v iff v = v or v = . Given Γ (S, B, p), we define erasure as follows. We type by
if the following holds.
• Γ (S , B , p )
• p 2 is p 1 with the statements marked h replaced by skip and expression marked h replaced by .
•
• For all ∈ dom(S ), S( ) S ( ).
• For all ∈ dom(S ) such that loclev(Γ ( )) = l, S ( ) = .
dom(B) ⊇ dom(B )
• For all c ∈ dom(B ), B(c) B (c).
• For all c ∈ dom(B ) such that cap(Γ (c)) = ∅, B (c) = .
Note that may appear as a counter in the buffer. Essentially, an erasure state agrees on l-marked parts of the program, l-level locations with the original, and the buffers for channels with non-0 capability. We also define the semantics for erasure states to be equivalent to the original except that writes to a h-level location writes , and receives from a 0 -channel never blocks, and branch on is arbitrary (it does not matter as both branch bodies are guaranteed to be skip). A write to is a no-op. More formally, we use the following modified rules. Γ on the reduced state is justified by preservation lemma essentially equivalent to Lemma B.3.
Note that all expressions whose type is h are erased. Then, the following follows from the type rule READ.
Lemma B.5 Erasure semantics never reads a h-level location (which includes high security locations H).
We can construct an erasure from the initial state. 
B.3 Simulation
Erasure semantics simulates the original up to l-level locations. More formally, Lemma B. Proof: By case analysis on the reduction kind. The key observation is that non-erased parts of the program are equivalent in the both sides of . 
B.4 Instrumented Semantics
We now instrument the semantics for erased states so that updates to locations are recorded per abstract location basis. Let absloc (ref(κ, τ ) q ) = κ. A state is now Γ (S, B, p); R where R is a mapping from abstract locations such that R(κ) contains list of updates for 's such that absloc(Γ( )) = κ. We extend the transition rules in a straightforward manner to record the updates.
B.5 Determinism
Let the states to be equivalent up to process reordering and renaming of locations, channels, and variables. The erased states (with the instrumentation) are confluent. The proof is much like the confluence theorem from [13] . The key observation is that capabilities guarantee that there can be at most one thread that can write to an l-level location, and that there can be at most one thread that can be blocked on a channel (recall that 0 channels are nonblocking in the erasure semantics). Thus any possible combination of reductions at a state commutes.
Because all the updates are recorded, the above lemma implies that updates to locations are deterministic as records cannot be "undone." The formal proof is much like that for confluence implying per-thread determinism from [13] .
Finally, the soundness theorem follows from Lemmas B.2, B.5, B.6 B.8, and B.10, that is, it follows from the fact that updates to low security locations L in the original semantics are simulated (i.e., over-approximated) by the erasure semantics (B.6,B.8), and that the erasure semantics is observationally deterministic (Lemmas B.5,B.10).
